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Abstract: Although the presence of the crucifix in public classrooms and other public offices is 
an ancient Italian tradition, it was never a political issue until recent times. In the early 2000s, 
some court cases and other events (first at the national and later also at the European level) 
turned the public display of the crucifix into a major issue in the national political debate. This 
article analyses the frames used by social and political actors in the different phases of this 
debate, in order to understand its evolution and its connection to the broader discussion on 
values in the public sphere developed in Italy in recent times. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The presence of the crucifix in public schools (not to mention private Catholic schools) is an 
ancient Italian tradition, 1 mentioned for the first time in a royal decree in 1860 and never 
formally abolished. Yet the subject was apparently never regarded as a legitimate issue in the 
public debate until the 2000s, when it suddenly became – at least in some political phases – 
one of the main bones of contention between some political and social actors. This 
contribution analyses the recent public discourse about the presence of the crucifix in public 
places (especially schools, but also tribunals, hospitals, polling stations, morgues, etc.) as 
developed in the last decade, in order to focus on the different frames and the various 
meanings of this symbol, as well as the factors and the processes making it a matter of public 
discussion. This case is particularly interesting – in the framework of the comparison between 
countries belonging to different cultural areas of the Mediterranean region carried out in this 
special issue – because, on the one hand, it shows that the separation between church and 
state (and religion and politics) is often partial even in supposedly secular or secularizing 
western European countries; and, on the other hand, that in those countries there are also 
active significant social and political forces trying to revitalize the public role of religion. 
Moreover, the debate over the crucifix in public spaces addresses broader issues within 
Italian society, such as multiculturalism and religious pluralism (particularly in relation to the 
growing Muslim community), and the boundaries of Italian political secularism. Italy is 
characterized by the institutional separation of state and religion, yet at the same time 
Catholicism is well-rooted in Italian culture (Cipriani, 1986, 2003; Marzano, 2009; 
Nesti, 2006). Therefore, Italy can be defined as a secular state where the role of religion as a 
tradition maintains its importance (Garelli, 2006, 2011), and, in terms of religious pluralism, 
as a religious monopoly, even though internally diversified (Diotallevi, 2002). This situation 
has however recently been challenged by the growing importance of Islam, which poses 
difficult questions to the Italian state (whose relationships with religions are regulated by a 
Concordat – for Catholicism – and a series of agreements with representatives of religious 
institutions – for other religions), since there is no unified structure to interact with 
(Triandafyllidou, 1999). 
Therefore, it can be affirmed that the debate over the visibility of the crucifix is at the 
crossroads of other questions: the special role of Catholicism in Italy, the definition of Italian 
political secularism (in a traditionally religious country) and the issues of pluralism, 
individual freedom and political secularism; as well as the issues of migration and 
multiculturalism, with migrants representing ‘the other’. 
We analysed about 900 articles published in the most prominent Italian newspapers 
(independent publications, such as Il Corriere della sera, La Stampa, La Repubblica, and some 
politically aligned newspapers, Libero, Il Giornale, Il Secolo d'Italia for the centre-right, 
and L'Unità and Liberazione for the centre-left) from the end of the 1990s to the end of 2011. 
We focus on the press as a public and despatialized sphere, which enlarges the public access 
but limits and selects the voices (see, for instance Grossi,2004), thus building the discursive 
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opportunity structure of a public debate by selecting the legitimate actors, voices and frames 
(see Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1992; Gamson & Meyer, 1996). 
We selected articles that discuss the crucifix issue, and used a text-driven coding scheme in 
order to understand in each particular case the political and religious meanings attributed to 
the crucifix. Using this material, we then reconstructed the crucifix ‘frames’ in the Italian 
debate. In other words, the public issues involving the crucifix include what we call a ‘meta-
communication’ regarding what kind of situation we are dealing with – whether a religious 
controversy or a political struggle, for instance (Bateson, 1972; Goffman, 1974; Yanow & Van 
Hulst, 2009).2 Specifically, we focus on (1) the meaning and frames related to the crucifix 
issue; (2) the relations between events and activation of frames – in terms of type of events, 
process of framing and counter-framing, differences in activation of frames, and the process of 
problematization of the crucifix issue in the public sphere (see Bacchi, 2012; 
Colebatch, 2006); and (3) the relationships between social actors and frames (Cefaï, 2007). 
The analysis of the crucifix debate in contemporary Italy allows specific insights on the role of 
religion(s) in a liberal democracy: whether or not the church is a legitimate actor in public 
debates, to what extent are religious arguments legitimate in the press arena, and what are 
the reciprocal attitudes and behaviours of church and state. 
The next section presents a brief historical contextualization of the crucifix debate, followed 
by the results of empirical analysis, and a short discussion of the outcomes. 
 
 
THE CRUCIFIX DEBATE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In order to be properly understood, the debate about the crucifix must be framed in the 
peculiar history of the Italian state and its relations with the Catholic Church, which started 
with conflict. The new Italian kingdom enacted, in its early years, a series of laws revoking 
many church privileges and banning several religious orders (Verucci, 1999). The pope 
refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Italian state and considered himself a political 
prisoner while forbidding Catholics to participate in politics (Menozzi, 1997; Coppa, 1995). 
Despite the creation of a secular school system, the presence of the crucifix in classrooms was 
not regulated,3 and the item was often included in the furniture of public schools' classrooms 
– at least after the laws Lanza (1857) and Casati (1859), which ordered the inclusion of 
religion in schools' curricula. It is also mentioned explicitly in the 1924 Royal Decree No. 965 
(part of an agreement between the church and the new fascist regime, granting substantial 
concessions to the Vatican) that established the presence in every classroom of ‘the image of 
the crucifix and the portrait of the King’. This article had been deemed necessary since more 
and more schools and their classrooms did not display crucifixes (Coppa, 1995). The crucifix 
was also made compulsory (for other public offices) by the Ordinanza Ministeriale No. 250 of 
11 November 1923 and (for courtrooms) by the 1926 Circolare No. 1967 of the Ministry of 
Justice. The decrees and regulations were never repealed, since neither the Concordato of 
1929 (Patti Lateranensi) nor the Law No. 641 of 1967 (dealing with the furniture of 
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classrooms) changed its dispositions. However, more recently authoritative jurists have put 
forward the opinion that such regulations had been implicitly repealed as a consequence of 
the new laws regarding the relation between church and state, especially after the revision of 
the Concordat (Concordato) in 1984 (Coppa, 1995). Although from time to time isolated cases 
of people asking to remove crucifixes from public offices arose, the situation did not change, 
and the opinions opposing the presence of the crucifix were apparently contradicted by the 
1988 Advice No. 63 of the Council of State.4 
Over time – despite the influence of the Christian Democracy (DC) party after World War II – 
Italian society became increasingly secularized, with a cumulative detachment of society from 
religious authority (Garelli et al., 2003; Ceccarini & Diamanti, 2007; Maraffi, 2007; 
Kalyva, 1996; Moos, 1945; Warner, 2000; Vree, 1975). The church also experienced a process 
of change, culminating in the Second Vatican Council (1962–65), while undergoing thorough 
internal pluralization (Favale, 1991; Tosi & Vitale, 2009). During this time, some tenets of the 
traditional society were put into question, yet the public display of the crucifix was never 
regarded as an issue. 
In the 1990s, the political situation changed abruptly, with the break-up of Christian 
Democracy. The church no longer had a single political reference and was free to represent 
different positions (Magister, 2001). Catholic leaders started to urge politicians and 
worshippers to protect certain values that were presented not as Catholic but as fundamental, 
as shared even by non-religious people (Pace, 2003). In particular, the Italian Bishops' 
Conference developed the ‘Progetto Culturale’ (‘Cultural Project’) aiming to achieve Catholic 
hegemony in society (Ceccarini & Diamanti, 2007). Even then, the status quo regarding the 
crucifix did not change, although there were isolated voices demanding crucifixes to be 
withdrawn from public schools. 
Things changed after 9/11, when the political debate reoriented towards the inclusion of 
ethical and ‘civilizational’ issues: a trend also promoted, as highlighted in the introduction to 
this special issue, by a worldwide process of deprivatization of religion (Haynes, 2011). New 
political entrepreneurs, both in the centre-right and the centre-left, thus started to exploit 
issues such as gay rights, abortion, euthanasia, and research on stem cells, to bolster their 
legitimacy and garner Catholic votes (Baccetti, 2007; Galli, 2004). As a consequence of this 
new situation, the framework for the politicization of the crucifix was finally set.5 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE DEBATE 
This section will analyse Italian public debate about the crucifix issue from the early 2000s to 
the end of 2011. The discussion revolves around three different symbolic meanings of the 
crucifix: (1) a religious symbol, (2) a symbol of cultural heritage and national/western 
identity, and (3) a universal symbol of tolerance and freedom. On the basis of these meanings, 
different frames emerged about the crucifix display in public spaces. 
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a. The crucifix as a symbol of religious pluralism: the issue is whether the crucifix 
display limits religious minorities' rights or enacts them and it more broadly 
connects with the wider multiculturalism discourse in Italy, Europe and the 
Mediterranean region. 
b. The crucifix as a symbol of religious tolerance: the ways and the places where it can 
be placed are related to the respect of religious rights (in terms of blasphemy, for 
instance). It differs from frame (a): while in that case the issue at stake is related to 
religious pluralism, frame (b) focuses on the respects of the rights of each and every 
religion. 
c. The crucifix debate as a matter of political secularism: it is related to Catholic 
Church–Italian state relations and, more broadly, to the relationships between the 
state and religions. 
d. The display of the crucifix as a matter related to the boundaries of government 
(Europe, State) interventions and, more broadly, to what can be considered as a 
matter of political or law regulations (an issue more broadly connected with the 
boundaries of the private/public spheres). 
e. The crucifix as a symbol of national and/or western identity, in opposition to the 
EU's political power or in an anti-immigrants perspective. 
The following paragraphs will show how and when these frames were adopted by Italian 
political and social actors in the different phases of the debate about the crucifix. 
 
 
Adel Smith and the First Wave of the Debate (2001–03) 
A significant debate about the issue of the crucifix started in late 2001, after the participation 
of a radical Muslim leader, Adel Smith,6 in a leading political talk show (Porta a Porta): he 
stated that ‘Christians adore a miniature corpse, hung on a piece of wood’, a ‘symbol of a 
suicide-deicide’: therefore, it should not appear on the walls of public schools, since it could 
shock children. Such remarks, indeed, managed to shock most of the Italian Catholic 
population: a feeling well epitomized by the headline of the Catholic newspaper L'Avvenire: ‘A 
Blow at the Foundations: The Crucifix Mocked’ (Ga, 2001). 
In the ensuing debate, Adel Smith had virtually no supporters, although the issue drew much 
more attention from the right wing of the political spectrum than from the left, whose 
newspapers and politicians mostly kept silent. Most voices said that they refused to accept 
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lessons from Smith, who, they claimed, had deliberately offended Christianity: thus, the issue 
was mostly framed in terms of respect for Catholicism. At first there seemed to be no anti-
Muslim reaction, at least in the mainstream, while the Catholic Church itself deplored the 
media allowing a controversial person to speak to millions of people (Casadio, 2001). 
This event turned the crucifix debate into a national issue: in the following weeks several 
other incidents were highlighted by the media: the elimination of the crucifix from the room 
where the Constitutional Court assembled (14 November 2001); statements against the 
presence of the cross in public offices made by the Union of Atheists, Agnostics and 
Rationalists (UAAR) (18 November); a motion approved in one of Rome's elected district 
assemblies asking all school deans to hang the crucifix in classrooms (24 December); some 
alleged cases of crucifixes burned during left-wing demonstrations in Genoa and Rome (28 
December); and the issue of a Muslim nurse asking to remove crucifixes from the walls of a 
Milan hospital (28 December). 
It was the Northern League that embraced the struggle more resolutely and radically, shifting 
the debate towards an identity and civilizational frame: the party issued, in May 2002, a 
proposal for a law (signed by MP Federico Bricolo) to make compulsory the presence of the 
crucifix not only in schools but in all public offices, as ‘an essential part of the historical and 
cultural heritage of our country’, since ‘respecting minorities does not mean to give up, 
delegitimize or change the symbols and values that are an integral part of the history, culture 
and tradition of our country’. Pointing to the then ongoing debate about the inclusion of a 
reference to Christian roots in the draft of the European Constitution, Bricolo added that 
‘every people has its flag, but the crucifix is the symbol uniting all European countries, and not 
only them’ (Zangrando, 2002). The Northern League's newspaper, La Padania, was even more 
outspoken, writing about ‘an iconoclast frenzy, often promoted by Muslim immigrants, that 
found dedicated supporters among the followers of the multi-racial ideology’, and remarking 
that ‘Muslims will have to give up the attempt to eradicate roots deep in the history and 
values of the people hosting them, showing them a tolerance completely unknown in Muslim 
lands’ (Ferrari, 2002). 
After some months of silence, the controversies were revived in September 2002 by the 
minister of education, Letizia Moratti (close to Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia), a few days 
after an exhortation to defend the crucifix made by the pope (albeit without specific 
references to the Italian context). In Parliament, Moratti remarked that ‘it is our duty to 
ensure that the crucifix is exposed in classrooms, as a mark of the deep Christian roots of our 
country and the whole of Europe’, adding that she was planning to regulate the presence of 
the crucifix in schools (La Rocca, 2002a). Many representatives of the centre-right were not 
afraid to support the proposal, sometimes displaying anti-Islamic opinions: Forza Italia's 
Fabio Garagnani remarked that ‘the crucifix will remind Muslim students that they are hosted 
in a country with a deeply-rooted culture’. However, although almost the whole of the political 
spectrum had been ready to defend the crucifix against Adel Smith's attacks, there was much 
more hesitation to support the imposition of the symbol. The political and cultural left, for 
example the Greens, framed the controversy in terms of state–church boundaries, denouncing 
the draft as ‘an attack on state secularism, and the useless reopening of old conflicts’, and 
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accused the proponents of the law of carrying out ‘a crusade’; but many centre-left politicians, 
such as Anna Finocchiaro, also seemed wary of displaying strong pro-secular opinions, 
claiming not to be bothered by the sight of the crucifix (Capponi, 2002). Most statements were 
indeed not aimed against the crucifix as a symbol, but rather raised doubts about its 
imposition, and the motives behind it – not least, because the Northern League itself had 
displayed pagan and anti-Catholic attitudes until the 1990s (see Guolo, 2011; 
Bertezzolo, 2011). Some Catholic politicians were also perplexed: not only ‘liberal’ ones, such 
as Romano Prodi and Alberto Monticone, but also some conservative leaders, such as Rocco 
Buttiglione and Carlo Giovanardi, who believed that the struggle in favour of the crucifix was 
right, but should not become a political/politicized issue. The campaign was also opposed by a 
few secular centre-right politicians, such as Giorgio La Malfa and Egidio Sterpa (La 
Rocca,2002b). The church itself was not ready to support it: for example, Cardinal Ersilio 
Tonini pointed out that ‘this issue should not be involved in the struggle between parties’, and 
should be a matter of decision for families, not for the state (Arachi, 2002). This attitude was 
noticed and deplored by Bricolo himself, who wrote a letter to L'Avvenire, the Italian Bishops 
Conference's newspaper, demanding more attention for his campaign (Capponi, 2002; 
Sersale, 2002). 
Thus, at least four different frames emerged. Some on the left (and also a few secular right-
wing politicians) believed that the obligation to keep the crucifix in schools would be an 
attack against secularism. Most Catholics (but also some secular people) in both coalitions 
believed that the crucifix is part of the Italian culture – or, at least, a tradition to respect – but 
cannot be imposed by sheer force. On the centre-right the main frame regarded the crucifix as 
the symbol of Italian and European civilization (connecting the issue to the debate about the 
mention of Christian roots in the European constitution) that can rightfully be imposed by 
law. Finally, the Northern League and some other politicians in the wider centre-right saw it 
as a symbol to support in order to defend Italy and ‘western civilization’ from an alleged 
Muslim ‘invasion’. This phase of the debate was without doubt the most intense of the decade, 
with dozens of newspaper articles and statements by virtually all major politicians. Indeed, 
the Ministry of Education enacted a directive and a note (n.2666 and n.2667, 3 October 2002) 
calling on the relevant schools' management to ensure that the crucifix was shown in the 
classrooms. 
Ten months of quiescence followed, until September 2003 when the debate was again revived 
by Adel Smith, who demanded permission to display an Islamic religious symbol in his son's 
classroom, beside the crucifix. The official answer by minister Moratti was that no religious 
symbol other than the crucifix could be displayed in public schools. Bricolo, and other 
Northern League politicians, this time seemed to adopt more explicitly a dual approach 
(joining the civilizational and the church-state boundaries frames), deploring not only Muslim 
interference, but also a ‘hyper-secular, anti-identitarian and relativist drift … aiming at erasing 
from the culture of our youth every trace of our history’ (La Padania, 2003). The debate 
became particularly strident in the following month, when a judge ordered the crucifix to be 
removed from the classroom of Smith's son. This caused rage in the centre-right, which 
promoted not one, but three law proposals (this time signed also by some centre-left 
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politicians) aiming at making compulsory the presence of the crucifix. The reactions were 
almost unanimously against the sentence: even in the centre-left, prominent politicians 
defined it as ‘stretched’ (Walter Veltroni), and ‘without intelligence’ (Pierluigi Castagnetti). 
Only the Radical Party and some parties of the left, such as Communist Refoundation, 
supported a sentence ‘marked by tolerance’ (Marco Pannella), deploring the general reaction 
as ‘a fundamentalist and partly hysterical crusade’ (Giovanni Russo Spena) (Amabile, 2003). 
However, even the president of the Republic, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi (a former member of the 
anti-fascist resistance, with a secular background), felt the urge to intervene on the opposite 
side, declaring that ‘the crucifix in schools has always been regarded not only as the earmark 
of a specific religious creed, but also as a symbol of values that are at the foundation of our 
identity’ (Dell'Orefice, 2003). The idea of the crucifix as a symbol rooted in Italian tradition 
seemed thus to be widely shared, not only by the centre-right, but also by many actors 
belonging to the secular left. 
 
 
The Church Gets Actively Involved (2005–07) 
Events of 2005–07 mainly centred on two legal controversies, which however failed to attract 
as much attention as the events of the two previous waves. The first case involved a judge, 
Luigi Tosti, who demanded the crucifix be removed from his courtroom, then tried to add to it 
a Jewish menorah, then went on strike (and was consequently sentenced to seven months in 
prison). The other case involved Soile Lautsi, a young mother born in Finland and a UAAR 
member, who engaged in a long legal struggle in order to get the crucifix removed from the 
walls of her children's school in Abano Terme, near Padua (a traditionally Catholic region, in 
the heart of the Northern League's ‘kingdom’). Her case became well known after a ruling by 
the Council of State, which in February 2006 upheld the presence of the crucifix in public 
schools, by declaring it the representation of significant civic values, ‘founding and inspiring 
our constitutional order’, ‘a symbol that adequately expresses the religious origin of the 
values of tolerance, mutual respect, human development, rights achievement, respect for the 
autonomy of conscience towards authority, human solidarity, refusal of every discrimination 
that mark the Italian civilization’. This sentence paved the way for a new kind of framing for 
the crucifix issue, no longer focused mainly on its value as a symbol of Italian and western 
civilization, but also seeing it more explicitly as a religious symbol. A new attitude mirrored by 
the statements of some centre-right politicians, such as Maurizio Gasparri, while the centrist 
Rocco Buttiglione repeated the old mantra, according to which the crucifix is not only a 
religious symbol, but also a civic one. Some opponents of the sentence also framed it in 
religious terms, pointing to the discrimination it would engender for non-Christian students 
(Enrico Borselli) (Arachi, 2006; Re, 2006). The Right seemed to try to use this ruling to frame 
the crucifix as a symbol of moderation (in a frame involving religious tolerance), in opposition 
to the intolerance and the violence of its opponents, both ‘religious fundamentalists’ and 
secular hardliners. To put such remarks into context, we must mention that in July 2005 the 
Italian public debate had been monopolized by the discussion about the referenda on assisted 
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procreation and the use of stem cells for research. In the following years, the centre-left would 
espouse ‘secular’ issues, such as legalizing civil unions between homosexuals, while the 
centre-right would surge as the paladin of religious conservative causes. 
This evolution in the public discourse was also evident in December 2006, when Pope 
Benedict XVI spoke explicitly of the presence of ‘religion and its symbols’ in the public sphere, 
in a world in which secularism ‘has come to mean the exclusion of religious symbols from 
public places’, claiming that religion, ‘has to be recognized as a public presence of the 
community’. The pope's intervention was warmly welcomed not only by the centre-right, but 
also by the Catholic leader of the centre-left coalition, Romano Prodi (Accattoli, 2006). 
In 2007, a few events were reported, mainly by the right-wing newspaper Il Giornale, owned 
by the brother of Silvio Berlusconi (then leader of the opposition), mostly framing the crucifix 
as the symbol of western and Christian tolerance, in opposition to an alleged secular and 
Muslim intolerance (see for example Ferrara, 2007). 
 
 
The Debate about the Spanish Case (2008–09) 
In late 2008 the crucifix issue came to the fore again when newspapers reported that the new 
(socialist) Spanish government intended to remove the crucifix from schools. Openly critical 
reactions flourished, such as that of a Catholic right-wing opinion leader, Antonio Socci, who 
connected the Spanish proposal to the Nazi acts against the church (Socci, 2008). More 
broadly, the Italian right-wing press strongly criticized the Spanish court's decision, since 
‘attacking the crucifix means to assault our own historical memory, it risks re-activating 
rooted hatred’ (Il Foglio, 2008). The decision was also connected to the issue of 
multiculturalism, with an idea of the crucifix as ‘a valuable object, almost a talisman' against 
Islam (Maglie, 2008). The crucifix was, again, seen as a symbol of both identity and religion. 
Moreover, there was a stronger emphasis on its historical value: not only is the crucifix a 
symbol of identity and tradition, but it also includes the historical memory of the nation. In 
the words of Daniele Menozzi, a historian of Christianity, ‘The crucifix issue is related to [the 
idea that] the Church has the task of providing the fundamental values underpinning civil 
society’ (Bucci, 2008). The crucifix, thus, is a symbol of an old and well-rooted relationship 
between church and state – in other words, it is a symbol of a specific configuration of political 
secularism. 
The case gained much attention in the mass media, especially because of the church's 
criticisms. Osservatore Romano (the Vatican's unofficial newspaper) stated that this court 
sentence turned political secularism into an anticlerical struggle, while the crucifix is a symbol 
that embodies the noblest values, adding that it was an example of ‘laicism [fostering] a God-
State, with absolute power over the souls’ (La Stampa, 2008). Avvenire (the Italian Bishops 
Conference's newspaper) reported the words of a Spanish cardinal stating that the sentence 
was a form of ‘christophobia […] for the sake of a new project of society - that will kill the 
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mankind itself’ (Coricelli, 2008). What emerges here is a counter-framing of the crucifix issue: 
far from being a clerical imposition, the classroom crucifix is perceived as a symbol of 
freedom. On the contrary, its removal is the action of an absolute power that does not admit 
other values than the secular ones. 
Nevertheless, there were some differences within the church. Avvenire commented that the 
crucifix meaning depends on the context: while inside a church it is a religious symbol, outside 
it is culture, tradition, values (Coricelli, 2008; Dalla Torre, 2009): that is, the traditional 
interpretation of the previous years (see Boffo, 2008). 
The Spanish case indeed reactivated the crucifix issue, and the media arena gave much room 
to the church's position. Apart from that, only a handful of other Italian cases were mentioned 
between November 2008 and July 2009, and the positions of social and political actors did not 
change. The church underlined the universal value of the crucifix, as a symbol of freedom and, 
at the same time, of religion, to be defended by both believers and secular citizens. The 
political right framed the symbolic value of the crucifix in terms of cultural identity, reframing 
the original Italian focus towards a broader ‘western’ identity. According to this perspective, 
the crucifix's presence in the public sphere can become a way of proudly affirming tolerance, 
freedom and western values against religious ‘fundamentalism’. At the same time, there was a 
continuous swing between two frames: on the one hand, the crucifix as cultural identity and, 
on the other, the crucifix as religious symbol: for example, when it was used by artists it was 
its religious value that has to be defended against blasphemy and offence. Finally, the political 
left discussed the crucifix as a symbol of a specific configuration of political secularism, which 
(according to some) had to be changed. 
 
 
The Lautsi Case in the European Courts (2009–11) 
In November 2009, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) made a unanimous decision 
on the case of Soile Lautsi. After the Italian courts had decided against her request, she had 
brought the case to Strasbourg – and the ECHR decided for the removal of the crucifix, stating 
that, as the crucifix is a religious symbol, its presence in public schools is not compatible with 
pluralism, and could be discriminatory. This decision added a new frame to the discussion, 
related to the boundaries between national and European government (with the EU seen as 
hegemonized by a secular point of view and willing to erase the identities of the nation-states) 
and triggered both a wide and strident debate and several initiatives. The centre-right 
government immediately announced that it was going to file an appeal to the court, and a 
month later the Popolo della Libertà (PDL or People of Freedom) presented to the Italian 
Parliament a law proposal to make compulsory the display of the crucifix in public spaces. The 
Northern League also gathered signatures for a referendum and proposed to add a cross to 
the Italian flag. Right-wing militants offered crucifixes to the European court's judges (while 
then prime minister Berlusconi gave some female European Parliament deputies a cross-
shaped pendant). Several mayors bought and hung crucifixes, offered them to citizens, and 
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imposed sanctions against their removal from public spaces, while both organized and 
spontaneous groups of citizens promoted public actions in favour of displaying the crucifix. 
The Italian minister of education, Mariastella Gelmini, declared that the crucifix in classrooms 
is a symbol of pluralism, and that ‘the crucifix's removal means to remove our culture, and, 
therefore, ourselves’; the same position was expressed by Pierferdinando Casini, the leader of 
the (explicitly Catholic) Union of the Centre (Mannucci, 2009). Gianfranco Fini, the leader of 
the right-wing section of the PDL, stated that the court's ruling ‘denies political secularism and 
the role of Christianity in Italian society’ (De Ponti, 2009). Renato Schifani (PDL), maintained 
that ‘it is a removal of values from Europe, and this is a mistake. However, it is not a court 
decision that can erase our identity’ (Mannucci, 2009). Berlusconi himself, referring to 
Benedetto Croce's well-known statement, said that ‘we cannot but call ourselves Christians’ 
(La Rocca, 2009). 
As usual, the Northern League stood out as the most vocal defender of the crucifix, with its 
usual civilizational stance, taking a hard position against ‘the victory of absolute relativism’, 
and ‘Europe giving up its own defence’ (Iezzi, 2009). The issue was obviously connected to the 
immigration issue, and La Padania pointed out that the ‘Islamic communities in 
Padania7 territories try to impose in our schools unacceptable behaviours, such as the 
crucifix's removal’ (Girardin, 2009). There was even concern over the very possibility for non-
believers to make decisions over religion (Morigi, 2009). 
Some right-wing publications asserted the necessity to defend the public presence of the 
crucifix for its religious value: Il Tempocompared contemporary Catholics to historical 
martyrs (Rondoni, 2009); Il Foglio stated that ‘framing the crucifix in a national identity 
perspective is quite risky’ (Silva, 2009); and a few commentators even defined the European 
Court's vote as a vote ‘for Barabbas’ (Conte, 2009). 
Many centre-left politicians disapproved, too. The PD's leader, Pierluigi Bersani, underlined 
that the crucifix is a harmless symbol of a well-rooted tradition (De Carolis, 2009), and Sergio 
Chiamparino, Turin's mayor, framed the crucifix as a symbol of identity and tradition. The 
newspaper Il Riformista, close to the PD, criticized the sentence as being an assault against 
national identity and an illicit interference in Italian domestic affairs (Ippolito, 2009). A few 
voices from leftist parties were favourable to the ruling: the leader of Communist 
Refoundation, Paolo Ferrero (who is Waldensian8), maintained it was a decision that upheld 
political secularism (Masci, 2009); while others tried to shift the focus to ‘more important 
issues, such as unemployment’ (Ravera, 2009) ‘real Church power: private schools, public 
funding’ (Mancuso, 2009). More broadly, leftist commentators were very focused on 
denouncing the politicization of the crucifix for electoral reasons ‘like a cheque-book for 
buying power’ (as suggested by the performer Moni Ovadia [2009]) and as a ‘national flag’ 
(Gentiloni, 2009). The defence of the crucifix was compared to several anti-immigrant actions 
and events, pointing out the political manipulation of religion, in a frame of tolerance towards 
‘the other’. 
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On its side, the church's reaction maintained its criticism towards the decision, remembering 
the historical role of Christianity, its being part of the Italian identity, and the symbolic 
meaning of the crucifix, related to tolerance, freedom, equality and human dignity. It affirmed 
that trying to separate the Italian identity from its roots was a mistake and that there was a 
huge risk in erasing values from the public sphere, turning Europe into an empty space 
governed by the market (Squillaci, 2009; Masci,2009). Reacting to the accusation of 
diminishing the crucifix's value by framing it as an identity symbol, Cardinal Angelo Bagnasco 
(chairman of the Conference of the Italian bishops) affirmed that it is exactly its religious 
character that makes the crucifix so essential as an identity signifier (Mazza, 2009). The 
religious movement Communion and Liberation also framed the crucifix removal as a 
challenge against faith, calling for believers to react. In the following months, a few Catholic 
voices took a different position on the public presence of the crucifix, by affirming that it could 
also be seen as a symbol of power, while the church has the duty to stand up for the powerless 
(see for instance Gentiloni, 2010). 
The appeal submitted by the Italian government was admitted by the European court in 
March 2010, took place in July, and a final decision was reached by the court in March 2011 
(Annicchino, 2010). Church, mass media and Italian politics awaited the court's final decision 
with growing concern. Avvenire described it as a ‘turning point decision. Europe has to decide 
whether it will guarantee the culture of all or none’ (Salvi, 2010). However, the very 
admission of the appeal was welcomed by some Catholics as ‘an Italian victory over 
secularism’ (Fornari, 2010). In June 2010, several newspapers published and discussed the 
content of the appeal, highlighting as crucial elements the relationship between the European 
Union and European states and the meaning of the crucifix. 
Since it was a European decision, attention shifted from national to international politics, 
focusing on which states and religious communities agreed with the Italian appeal: while 
European Jewish communities, the Orthodox Churches and most Eastern states stood with 
Italy, the Waldensians stated their opposition, and some traditionally Catholic states, like 
Portugal and Spain, remained mute (Silvestre, 2010). 
A final decision over the Italian appeal was delivered on 18 March 2011, stating that the 
crucifix is not a discriminatory symbol. The political and religious reactions were different 
and, surprisingly, the debate drew little attention in the public arena. Some PDL politicians 
declared it ‘a great victory for the defence of an essential symbol of the history and the 
cultural identity of our country’ (Santambrogio, 2011), a ‘victory over a secularist [laicista] 
Europe’ (Offeddu, 2011), but also a reaffirmation of Europe's ‘own values and identity’ 
(Cavallieri, 2011), while the future leader of the party (then minister of justice) Angelino 
Alfano declared that the sentence had ‘restored the dignity of our Christian roots’ 
(Zatterin, 2011). The centrist Rocco Buttiglione remarked that the Christian symbols, such as 
the crucifix, in Europe are ‘a-confessional’, as part of a common culture (Fornari,2011). Also 
on the left, both secular politicians such as Vannino Chiti and Christian ones such as Leoluca 
Orlando (who defined the crucifix as ‘a synthesis of tolerance, respect and universal love’) 
made positive remarks, as well as some voices within the ‘progressive’ Catholic world, such as 
the ACLI (Organization of the Christian Workers) leader Andrea Olivero. The Catholic Church, 
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through the organization of the Italian bishops, also triumphantly declared that ‘order had 
been restored against nihilism’ (Zatterin, 2011). Only the Waldensian and Jewish 
communities' leaders cast doubt on the recognition of the crucifix as a cultural symbol 
(Gillio, 2011; Zatterin, 2011), while a few left-wing intellectuals, such as Sergio Luzzatto9 and 
Gian Enrico Rusconi, openly criticized the sentence. Interestingly, there were no recorded 
reactions from either the Northern League leaders or pro-secular forces such as the Radical 
party. 
A few days before, the Corte di Cassazione had also reached the final decision about Judge 
Tosti's case, ruling against him, and this news was welcomed by the political right as well as 
by the church. The sentence stated that the crucifix was the only symbol admitted in 
courtrooms, and right-wing commentators argued that this was recognition of the importance 
of Christianity for the Italian national identity. The Right defined the sentence as a victory for 
the Christian identity of Italy and Europe, and the Northern League immediately proposed to 
hang the crucifix even in the Italian Parliament. On the other hand, the radical left commented 
that it was a disempowerment of the crucifix, transforming it into a lay symbol. The church 
welcomed the decision and while thanking the crucifix defenders it also criticized 
disrespectful uses of the symbol (Calabrò, 2011). 
The analysis of the debate over the crucifix issue between 1998 and 2012 leads to some 
interesting results, the focus of the next section. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS: CRUCIFIX AND DEMOCRACY – A DIFFICULT RELATIONSHIP 
In this concluding section we will discuss the outcomes of our research and comment on the 
analysis of the different meanings and frames that have been activated by the actors on the 
crucifix issue, the relations between actors and frames, and, more broadly, the relationship 
between religion and the state in contemporary Italy. 
The crucifix debate has an uneven development, with media attention focusing on specific 
events that act as landmarks: in 2001 Adel Smith's participation to the TV programme Porta a 
Porta, followed by a Northern League campaign; in 2002 the pope's exhortation to defend the 
crucifix and the Ministry of Education's call for the crucifix to be displayed in classrooms; in 
2003 Adel Smith's request to hang an Islamic symbol beside the crucifix in his son's 
classroom; in 2005 the court appeals of a judge (Tosti) and a mother (Lautsi) asking for the 
removal of the crucifix from a courtroom and a classroom; in 2008 the Spanish Socialist 
party's proposal to withdraw crucifixes from schools; in 2009 and 2011 the European Court of 
Human Rights' decisions on Lautsi's appeal. 
Although the frames – already described in the previous section of the paper – remain 
substantially the same, the ways social and political actors use them change significantly. 
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First, until 2008, the crucifix issue comes to the fore in relation to individuals' initiatives, and 
the dynamics are quite fragmented, revolving around specific events. The main problem at 
stake is indeed the right way of framing the crucifix issue: therefore, there is no arguing about 
the specific public buildings that hang the crucifix – be they schools, courtrooms, or hospitals. 
The social actors' positions are quite steady – the Left mostly focusing on political secularism, 
the mainstream centre-right on tradition and identity, the Northern League on the alleged 
Islamic threat, and the Catholics on respect. In this phase, the church barely intervenes, and it 
starts to take a more active role in the discussion only with Benedict XVI's papacy, from 2005. 
After this date, Catholic civil society also increases its role in the discussion, mainly 
underlining the universal value of the crucifix as a symbol of tolerance and dignity. However, 
it is only in 2009 that the debate significantly changes, as a consequence of the courts' 
decisions, turning into a reactive discussion, while local events gain media coverage only as 
examples reframed in the broader debate about the meaning of the crucifix symbolism. In 
2008, the Spanish case had already shifted attention towards the fate of the crucifix in other 
(Mediterranean) countries, and the debate had also started to be reframed in an international 
context. In this phase the debate can therefore be qualified as a reaction to policy/court 
decisions, while new – both national and international – actors intervene and the discussion 
enlarges its horizons, becoming more coherent and international. The domestic debate also 
becomes more polarized, in a context marked out more openly by the politicization of ethical 
and identity-related issues. However – although the positions range from the Northern 
League's stance, demanding the crucifix be displayed everywhere, to the one of the radical 
left, asking for the crucifix to be removed from public spaces – a large majority of social and 
political actors takes a hostile stance towards the possibility that the European Court will 
impose the removal of crucifixes (also framing the issue in terms of respect for national 
sovereignty). As a whole, the dynamic of political and public opinion seems therefore to be 
focusing on maintaining the status quo: while in the early phases of the debate most actors 
(even most Catholic actors) oppose the Northern League's attempts to impose the crucifix by 
law, in the second phase there is a wide consensus (including the political centre-left) in 
opposing its removal as a consequence of a court sentence. 
More broadly, this debate shows the problems in managing the role of religious symbols in 
the public sphere in contemporary Italy. These problems are apparently increased by two 
factors connected to the recent developments in the Italian political system: on the one hand, 
we can see a Catholic Church increasingly aware of its public role as an advocacy interest 
group (which confirms the hypothesis of a trend towards a greater involvement of the 
churches in politics highlighted in the introduction to this special issue), in a political system 
no longer marked out by the presence of a ‘big’ Catholic party; on the other hand, it is evident 
that an increasing range of social and political actors are eager to exploit religious issues for 
their ends. This translates, in turn, into a multiplication not only of frames, but also of 
dynamics of interaction among frames as well as among actors. This situation is complicated 
by the fact that an issue such as that related to the presence of the crucifix in public spaces is 
at the crossroad of several debates, related to the boundaries between religion and state 
secularism, to the tensions engendered by the growing processes of secularization and 
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religious pluralization (as a consequence of the increasing presence of Islam), and also to the 
limits of the power of the European institutions, face to face with the nation-states. 
Perhaps as a consequence of this complicated situation, however, most Italian actors – with 
the exception of some groups and parties: the Northern League and some of its allies in the 
mainstream right on the ‘Catholic’ side and the Radical Party and the parties connected to the 
communist left on the ‘secular’ one – seem to be willing not to shift the boundaries between 
religion and politics, but rather to maintain the status quo. 
In sum, this case confirms on the one hand that the wall of separation between religion and 
politics in Christian-majority European countries is not necessarily so impenetrable and 
immovable. On the other hand, our research shows (at least on the issue of religious symbols 
in public spaces) a rather stable situation that most relevant political and social actors seem 
willing to maintain, despite the growing challenges. 
 
 
NOTES 
1 For a historical reconstruction of the Italian legislation about the crucifix and the specific regulations 
of its display in public spaces see Manco (2005). 
2 For a critical summary on the wide literature on frames see also Dewulf et al. (2009). 
3 Except for the Royal Decree n. 4336 (15.9.1860) addressing elementary schools. The RD was a law 
enacted by the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont – the founding state of the kingdom of Italy, which was 
established in 1861. 
4 This document stated that the changes intervened in the discipline of religious teaching in public 
schools (that is, the secularization of the educational system and the transformation of religious 
teaching into an optional course) should have no impact on the presence of the crucifix (defined by the 
council as ‘the symbol of the Christian culture and civilization, in its historical roots, as a universal 
value, independently from a specific religious tradition’). 
5 And the crucifix also became a matter of scientific debate, especially in the Law field (see Bin et 
al., 2004; Cardia, 2010; Mancini, 2008). 
6 Smith is an Italian citizen who converted to Islam, well known for his radical stances on many issues 
and his provocative statements. He is the leader of the Union of Italian Muslims (Unione dei 
Musulmani d'Italia), which he claims to be representative of the Muslim community in Italy, although 
its opponents contend that it numbers very few members. 
7 ‘Padania’ is the name traditionally used by the Northern League to refer to the northern Italy areas, 
that they would like to become independent or, at least, autonomous from the Italian state. 
8 Waldensians are a small but authoritative Protestant church, whose followers are traditionally 
settled in some areas of the Piedmont region. 
9 Luzzatto (2011) also wrote a book, Il crocifisso di stato, supporting the removal of the crucifix.  
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